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Abstract—Peer authentication and secure data transmission
are vital aspects for many scenarios in the IP-based Internet of
Things (IoT). To enable end-to-end security, recent research and
standardization efforts focus on a number of IP security protocol
variants for the IoT, most notably Datagram TLS (DTLS), the
HIP Diet EXchange (DEX), and minimal IKEv2. In this dis-
sertation outline, we present the main motivation for employing
these protocol variants in constrained network environments and
discuss the need to surpass the status quo. Most importantly, we
highlight our identified challenges when employing these protocol
variants in constrained network environments and provide a
high-level overview of our previously proposed approaches to
counteract the identified design-level protocol issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Organizations such as ETSI, the IETF, and the ZigBee
Alliance undertake tremendous efforts towards standardizing
IP technology and application layer protocols for the inter-
connection of constrained devices and services in the Internet
of Things (IoT). Notably, these standardization efforts enable
end-to-end addressability, abstraction from device and network
constraints, and universal interoperability at the protocol level.
Network scenarios destined to benefit from the resulting stan-
dards range from small-scale home automation solutions to
large-scale industrial control systems and smart cities.
In many of these scenarios, sensed information and actu-
ation commands traverse untrusted networks, e.g., when ex-
changing information between constrained devices and Cloud
services via the Internet. The protection of sensitive infor-
mation thereby cannot only rely on network-specific security
measures within the individual constrained network domains.
Instead, sensitive information must be protected in an inter-
operable end-to-end manner to prevent information leakage
or the execution of harmful actuation tasks. To this end, IP
technology on constrained devices allows to reuse standard
security solutions of traditional IP networks. However, these
solutions do not specifically consider the limited computation,
memory, and energy resources of constrained devices as well
as the small packet size and lossy link characteristics of con-
strained networks in their protocol design. Thus, research and
standardization recently shifted their focus to more lightweight
variants of existing IP security protocols. These most notably
include DTLS [1], the HIP DEX [2], and minimal IKEv2 [3].
Although the proposed protocol variants aim at adapting
existing IP security solutions to the special requirements of
constrained network environments, most efforts are currently
limited to specifying minimal protocol profiles [3], [4]. These
profiles define a reduced set of required protocol functionality
and give recommendations for the selection of cryptographic
primitives. However, while profiles allow to minimize protocol
complexity and thus code size as an important applicability
metric for constrained devices, the current approaches are still
conservative in nature. In fact, HIP DEX proposes the most
radical adjustments by introducing an aggressive retransmis-
sion mechanism for the increased packet loss in constrained
network environments compared to traditional IP networks.
This retransmission mechanism requires one communication
end-point to continually send a handshake packet at short time
intervals until it receives the corresponding response from its
peer. We believe there is the need to go beyond mere protocol
profiling and the use of blunt force to achieve standards-based
end-to-end IP security that is suitable for the IoT.
In our dissertation work, we therefore ask ourselves the
following three high-level research questions regarding the
applicability of the proposed security protocol variants for
constrained network environments:
1) The adaptations of these protocols are currently restricted
to a limited set of measures. Hence, can we identify nec-
essary refinements that further tailor these protocols to the
new requirements of constrained network environments?
2) IoT scenarios often involve economies of scale and down-
scaling of hardware resources to reduce cost. Still, can we
enable the full potential of the proposed protocol variants
for tightly constrained devices that have insufficient re-
sources for a complete protocol implementation?
3) Layer separation and fragmentation allow to abstract from
specific network characteristics at the security protocol
layer. Thus, do adverse side-effects exist when deploying
the protocol variants in constrained environments?
In this dissertation outline, we highlight the main results
of our research and provide answers to the above questions.
II. PREREQUISITES
We now present the main assumptions for the abstract
network scenario that is in focus of our work and briefly
outline the methodology along which we conduct our research.
A. Network Scenario
As depicted in Fig. 1, the network scenario consists of con-
strained devices in an IoT domain, services that are located in
a local network or the Internet, and gateways that interconnect
these network domains. Constrained devices are assumed to
communicate over constrained network links, e.g., based on



















Fig. 1: Constrained devices (D) communicate with each other and
with local or Internet-based services (S) via a gateway (GW). Entities
belonging to an IoT domain are equipped with the 6LoWPAN layer.
Arrows indicate forwarding paths for specific protocol handshakes.
are IP-enabled and equipped with 6LoWPAN [5], an IETF-
standardized IPv6 adaptation layer for constrained network
environments. The gateway is connected to the local network
or the Internet via a commodity broadband connection.
Concerning device resources, we assume that constrained
devices are equipped with only a few MHz of computation
power, several kilobytes of RAM and several tens of kilobytes
of ROM. Furthermore, these devices may be battery-powered.
Gateways and services, on the contrary, run on common wall-
powered network and server hardware, respectively.
B. Research Methodology
Regarding our research methodology, we started with a
theoretical protocol analysis for each of our three high-level
research questions. We then formulated hypotheses for our-
selves about the protocol behavior in constrained network en-
vironments, i.e., with device and network constraints in mind.
We confirmed these hypotheses with real-world experiments,
thus substantiating the identified protocol design issues. Based
on these results, we then proposed approaches to counteract
the identified design-level protocol issues. One of the main
goals in developing our proposed approaches thereby was to
remain interoperable and standard-compliant.
III. IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED
APPROACHES
We now outline the main results of our dissertation work.
Specifically, we briefly present our identified protocol issues
and highlight the central ideas of our proposed approaches. We
conclude the presentation of each approach with an indication
of our chief evaluation results. Sections III-A and III-B thereby
target our first research question, whereas Section III-C and
Section III-D give answers to our second and third research
question, respectively. For detailed information and a com-
prehensive discussion of related work, we refer the interested
reader to our corresponding publications [6]–[9].
A. Tailoring Protocol Mechanisms
DTLS, HIP DEX, and minimal IKEv2 consider public-key
cryptography in their protocol design for peer authentication
and key agreement. More precisely, while DTLS optionally
defines a symmetric key-based handshake, HIP DEX and min-
imal IKEv2 mandate the use of public-key-based primitives.
We identified three main challenges that directly stem
from the use of public-key cryptography. First, public-key
operations involve a considerable amount of transmissions and
computation time. As a result, constrained devices are unable
to perform other tasks, e.g., packet forwarding, while the CPU
is busy computing cryptographic operations. Second, already
a single adversary can exploit these expensive operations on
a constrained device, e.g., with multiple handshakes in short
succession. Existing DoS protection mechanisms of IP security
protocols do not suffice to defend against such attacks [10].
Third, retransmissions of handshake packets are commonly
based on fixed timeouts. Consequently, these approaches do
not account for the varying packet processing times and cause
spurious retransmissions or delayed handshake conclusion. To
thwart these issues, we proposed three lightweight protocol
extensions. We thereby focused on HIP DEX, but also showed
that our extensions generalize to DTLS and minimal IKEv2.
Specifically, we presented a novel session resumption
mechanism for HIP DEX that is inspired by similar mecha-
nisms for TLS [11] and IKEv2 [12]. Notably, our mechanism
functionally extends on related work and focuses on the
reduction of the memory requirements for inactive sessions
and of radio transmissions during session resumption.
Moreover, we promoted the puzzle-based DoS protection
mechanism of HIP DEX for all proposed protocol variants and
tailored this mechanism to constrained network environments.
Particularly, we proposed a simple attack detection and puzzle
difficulty selection strategy based on a sliding window. We
further introduced a protocol extension that enables an on-
path gateway to collaborate in the puzzle difficulty selection
to account for device and network heterogeneity.
To take the varying processing times of handshake pack-
ets into account, we proposed an adaptive retransmission
mechanism that employs multiple worst-case estimates for
the retransmission timeout. More precisely, retransmissions of
packets triggering only inexpensive operations at the peer are
based on a network delay-based timeout, whereas expensive
handshake packets also employ a processing-based timeout.
Our evaluation confirmed that our proposed session re-
sumption mechanism substantially reduces the computation,
memory, and transmission overhead of the standard proto-
col. Moreover, our collaborative puzzle-based DoS protection
mechanism accounts for device and network heterogeneity and
successfully defends constrained devices against unconstrained
adversaries. Likewise, our refined retransmission mechanism
affords a timely handshake conclusion despite packet loss.
B. Adapting the Packet Format
Minimal IKEv2 and HIP DEX feature a concise four-way
protocol handshake. This stands in stark contrast to the DTLS
handshake that requires 6 round-trips and up to 15 packets.
Still, minimal IKEv2 and HIP DEX achieve their conciseness
at the cost of larger packet sizes, thus commonly causing
packet fragmentation. Packet fragmentation in turn leads to
an increased loss probability for the entire packet as the loss
of a single fragment results in the loss of the complete packet.
We focused our protocol analysis on HIP DEX and iden-
tified expendable information in its packet structure. While
often useful in the scope of Internet-based communication, the
transmission of this information is undesirable in constrained
network environments. To remove the identified redundancies
in the packet before transmission, we proposed the Slimfit
compression layer for HIP DEX. As its main building blocks,
Slimfit i) removes static packet content defined in the protocol
specification, ii) modifies the packet structure to increase
the compression efficiency, and iii) introduces an evolvable
compression scheme for cipher suite negotiation parameters.
Our evaluation showed that Slimfit perceivably decreases
retransmissions and even slightly reduces the HIP DEX hand-
shake processing overhead. Notably, the 2.5kB ROM overhead
is the only tradeoff for the transmission and computation gains.
C. Delegating the Session Establishment
The proposed protocol variants often exceed the available
memory resources of tightly constrained devices such as Tmote
Sky motes that are equipped with 48 kB of ROM and 10 kB of
RAM. The total overhead of Contiki OS including our public-
key-enabled DTLS implementation, for example, amounts to
about 75 kB of ROM and to just below 12 kB of RAM.
To still enable public-key-based peer authentication in
inter-domain scenarios, we proposed a handshake delegation
architecture. Our delegation architecture is based on the fact
that peers store session state across connections for session
resumption. This enables a trusted entity such as the device
owner to perform a public-key-based handshake on behalf
of the constrained device. Subsequently, the trusted entity
securely transfers the session resumption state that was estab-
lished during the initial handshake to the constrained device
via a secure channel. The constrained device then utilizes this
session state in an abbreviated session resumption handshake
that does not require public-key operations.
Our delegation architecture unburdens the constrained de-
vice from all public-key-related overheads and most DTLS
handshake complexities. Still, as a tradeoff, the transitive
security of our approach is weaker than the security properties
of DTLS without our architecture. A detailed evaluation and
overhead analysis remain as the last open item of our work.
D. Securing Packet Fragmentation
When deploying DTLS, HIP DEX, or minimal IKEv2 in
constrained network environments, handshake packets belong-
ing to these protocols commonly exceed the maximum frame
size of the employed link layer technologies. In case of link
layer-protected IEEE 802.15.4 frames, e.g., handshake packets
larger than 42 byte at the security protocol level typically
trigger fragmentation at the 6LoWPAN [5] layer.
An adversary, who is located inside the IoT domain, can
exploit this fragmentation mechanism by sending a duplicate
fragment with altered payload in reaction to an overheard
legitimate fragment. The fragment recipient then is unable to
distinguish the forged fragment from the legitimate one due
to the lack of per-fragment authentication. As a result, an
eavesdropping adversary can prevent the successful reassembly
of handshake packets at the cost of a single duplicate fragment.
Moreover, a reassembling node has to optimistically store
packet fragments and rely on a timeout mechanism to discard
incomplete packets. As a result, an adversary can occupy the
scarce buffer memory of a target node by sending an in-
complete fragmented packet. This malicious buffer reservation
enables the adversary to block the processing of fragmented
handshake packets by periodically sending a single fragment.
To defend against these fragmentation attacks, we pro-
posed lightweight security mechanisms at the 6LoWPAN layer.
Our content-chaining scheme provides efficient per-fragment
authentication by cryptographically binding the content of a
packet to its first fragment via a hash chain construction.
Our split buffer approach segments the reassembly buffer
into fragment-sized buffer slots. This segmentation enables the
processing of fragmented packets despite an adversary who
partially occupies the reassembly buffer at a target node. We
extended this split buffer with a packet discard strategy that
disposes of packets with suspicious sending behavior.
Our evaluation confirmed the existence of the identified
attacks and showed that our proposed mechanisms mitigate
these at moderate computation, memory, and transmission cost.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation outline1, we motivated the need for
standards-based IP security in the IoT. During our research,
we uncovered important design-level protocol issues when
employing the currently considered IP security protocol vari-
ants in constrained network environments. Our proposed ap-
proaches counteract these issues in an efficient and protocol-
compliant manner, and thus significantly improve the applica-
bility of these protocol variants for constrained environments.
We are currently in the process of disseminating our proposed
approaches at the IETF and hope that our research results have
a positive impact on future standards in our research domain.
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